Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

25X1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8107532

8107535

8107536

~~SECRET~~

March 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM

TO: See Distribution

FROM: Paul Bremer, III, Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Senior Interdepartmental Group Meeting on East-West Relations

The attached comments prepared by the JCS are for use at the March 12th SIG meeting on East-West relations.

Attachment:

As stated above.

DISTRIBUTION: Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The National Security Council
The Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Vice President

~~SECRET~~
GDS, 3/10/87

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

10 March 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR STOESSEL, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Terms of Reference for East-West Relations (U)

1. (U) The draft terms of reference (TOR) reviewed by the Senior Interdepartmental Group on 6 March 1981 provide a good starting point for the development of a sound policy. With the aim of improving the TOR, I recommend consideration of the below points pertaining to our overall approach.

2. (U) I propose that we develop the policy sequentially in order to insure that all elements of the policy contribute towards the attainment of our national objectives. We should, in order:

a. (U) Identify the major issues that need to be addressed in East-West rel[illegible]

b. (U) Identify our national policy objectives for the major issues.

c. (U) Develop a basic overarching policy that will prioritize US efforts and provide a framework for supporting policies and strategies.

d. (U) Develop specific policies relating to long-term issues and immediate problems.

e. (U) Develop specific strategies and initiatives to implement the policies.

3. (S) In this policy development process, we should also avoid two problems that could evolve from the present draft TOR. First, the policy should not be solely reactive to Soviet initiatives, but rather be an integrated framework for pursuing US national interests and for countering the Soviets. Second, we should be careful to keep East-West competition in proper perspective. While this competition and even confrontation are essential aspects, other elements are at play that invalidate viewing the world in terms of a "zero-sum game". It is important, therefore, that we recast the TOR to preclude an overemphasis on a win-all/lose-all perspective.

CLASSIFIED BY ASST CJCS
DECLASSIFY ON 9 MAR 87

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

4. (U) I trust that these general comments are useful. Specific comments and recommendations on the text of the TOR are annotated on the attached copy.

5. (U) We look forward to participating in this important policy development process.

JOHN S. PUSTAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Assistant to the Chairman, JC

Attachment
a/s

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

I. The Soviet Challenge	Intelligence Community
A. Soviet Goals	
B. Soviet Assets and Capabilities	
II. U.S. Response	
A. National Security Policy	DOD
B. Policy toward Allies and Neutrals	STATE (EUR/EA)
C. Policy toward the Developing World	STATE (Working Gr
D. Policy toward China	STATE (EA)
E. The Bilateral Relationship	STATE (SOV)
III. Immediate Problems	STATE
A. Poland	EE
B. Afghanistan	NEA
C. Persian Gulf	PM/NEA
D. TNF, SALT, Other Arms Control	PM
E. U.S. and Allied Consensus	SOV/ICA
IV. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations	STATE (S/P)

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Para 1. Change first and third sentences as shown.

Reason: More clearly identify areas of Soviet interest.

Para 2a: Change first sentence as shown.

Reason: Accuracy.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Terms of Reference

1 - Soviet Strategic Goals. Assess Soviet geopolitical objectives and long-term game plan, with an emphasis on Moscow's policy toward the US, Western Europe (Western Hemisphere), China, [Japan] (Northeast Asia) and the Mideast/Persian Gulf regions. What are the dimensions of the problem we must deal with in the near-midterm period? Discuss Moscow's priorities over the next 5-10 years (e.g. - economic/military; Europe/Northeast Asia/Middle East-Persian Gulf). What are Soviet goals in the developing world and can we identify any longer term objectives beyond the exploitation of "targets of opportunity"? To what degree do power/ideology influence these Soviet objectives, and how might this equation change with a new Soviet leadership generation?

2 - Soviet Strategic Assets/Liabilities. What are Soviet resources for pursuing their strategic goals in the 1980's?

a - Short-Term. How could the Soviets seek to exploit their combination of emerging strategic [superiority/parity] and clear conventional/theatre/chemical superiority, together with present US ICBM vulnerability, to score political gains over the next five years -- in Europe? vis-a-vis China and Japan? in the Persian Gulf? in the developing world? What are the Soviet targets which will be the most vulnerable to the use of military power for political pressure purposes? To what degree does the economic weakness of USSR and its allies, and the political vulnerability of its surrogates, undermine its capacity to sustain such pressures and make the Soviets vulnerable

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Para 2b. Change second sentence as shown.

Reason: More clearly identifies areas of Soviet interest.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

b - Mid-Term. Discuss prospects and implications of a Soviet Union in the mid 80s which combines great military strength and serious economic/energy weaknesses. What are the likely consequences in terms of Soviet policy toward US, Western Europe, Northeast Asia, Persian Gulf and developing countries? Is this situation likely to enhance Soviet proclivity to use military power for political/economic purposes, to promote greater cooperation with West or to pursue alternative diplomatic strategies (e.g. - accommodation with China). What will be the likely Soviet vulnerabilities (e.g. Eastern Europe) in this time period.

c - Longer Term. What are the prospects for more moderate Soviet foreign/security policy in the 1990's? How can our policies in the 80's enhance that possibility and ensure sufficient strength of US and core alliances should current Soviet policies persist.

2 - Soviet Internal Scene. Examine current Soviet political dynamics, prospects for Brezhnev succession and impact on US/Soviet relations. Assess state of Soviet economy including dependencies that could be exploited or could lead Moscow toward foreign adventures. Discuss Soviet nationalities problem and dissident movement and both opportunities/dangers they represent.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Para 5. Add the following at beginning of para:
"What are the major issues in US-Soviet relations? What is the current status of these issues? What are the US objectives for these major issues? How should the US pursue these objectives? In what priority?"

Reason: Provides framework for examining the problem and for developing a policy.

Para 5. Add the following sentence: Discuss political role of arms control negotiations, e.g. LRTNF, CW, SCC, in overall US/USSR bilateral relations.

Reason: Many bilateral fora such as SCC, can be used to maintain a favorable relationship. Conversely, negative actions affecting their operation can dramatically alter East/West relationships. (In particular with regard to our Allies.)

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Eastern Europe. Is Eastern Europe a long term strategic asset or liability for Moscow? In what ways short of military power can Soviets maintain control, in face of a changing Eastern Europe? Review the degrees of internal liberalization, external independence and "Westernization" of the East European states and discuss options for promoting the gradual development of these tre in cooperation with our key allies. Analyze how we can exploit endemic East European economic problems to enhance our influence and their freedom of action vis-a-vis Moscow, especially as the USSR is increasingly unable to bail them out. Discuss how these goals can be furthered in the short-term and longer-term without provoking internal political convulsions and Soviet interventions.

5 - US/Soviet Bilateral Relations. How can we exploit Soviet belief that they will be able "to do business" with tougher but more consistent US Administration? How do quest of style and rhetoric play into substance of our relations? Discuss the status of established bilateral cooperative arrangements and describe those that are advantageous to us and of real interest to Moscow. Discuss aspects of bilatera relationship which are outside the control of both parties. existing interests (e.g. - nuclear proliferation) and possible future common interests on which we might build.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Para 6. Reorder paragraphs a and b, i.e., make Strategy paragraph a and Force Improvement Priorities paragraph b.

Reason: To indicate relative priority of topics in para.

Para 6b. Add new sentence at beginning of sub-para.
"What are the objectives of US security policy in context of East-West relations?"

Reason: Need to define purpose of strategy.

Para 6b. Add new sentence at end of sub-para.
"How should security assistance contribute to attaining our goals?"

Reason: Need to examine role of security assistance.

Para 6c. Change first sentence to read:
"... serve the strategy and force improvements described above, recognizing that arms control is not a goal in itself and not a substitute for capabilities if deterrence fails?"

Reason: Put arms control in proper perspective.

Para 6c. Add new sentence after first sentence.
"How we should proceed with other arms control undertakings (Sverdlovsk/BW,CW,MBFR,ASAT)?"

Reason: Was in abbreviated terms of reference and should be retained in complete terms of reference.

Para 6c. Change last sentence to read:
"... discuss possible alternative objectives. Indicate how MBFR might work in parallel with initiation of CDE process.

Reason: Clarity.

Para 6c. Add as new last sentence:
"What is the proper relationship between SALT and the overall East/West relationship?"

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

6. US Military Counter-Strategy

a. Force Improvement Priorities - Give broad brush review of our strategic force assets/liabilities as backdrop US military requirements/options in key theaters of competition with USSR. Identify US conventional and theatre nuclear force posture weaknesses which undercut our capacity to compete effectively with the USSR in Western Europe, Northeast Asia, Persian Gulf and developing countries? Suggest what in broad terms needs to be done to correct conventional [and] TNF and theatre deficiencies, and, taking account of general Administration budgetary projections, assess regional priorities. Identify potential new developments (e.g.-ERW, CW) which require allied assent and discuss priorities and approach to securing it.

b. Strategy. How do we cope with Soviet strategic/theater conventional superiority in East/West competition? How can we restore our grip on escapation control and thus deter Soviet risk-taking in Europe and other parts of world? How credible is a horizontal escalation approach and how might it work? What is the relationship between our strategic goals and US/allied military assets? How could China and friendly third countries be associated with these efforts?

c - Arms Control. Discuss how the arms control process or actual agreements could, in tandem with force posture adjustments, serve the goals described above. In particular, identify current broad US/allied negotiating goals for

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Para 8. Add new sub-para at beginning:
"What are US objectives relating to political competition in the developing world? What regions are of major importance to the US now and for the next 10 years? Are all areas a target of competition or is there potential for cooperation in some? What other elements, i.e., nationalism, regionalism, etc., must be considered? What should the US do to attain its objectives?"

Reason: Policy should address what US wants and how to achieve it -- not just how to keep Soviets from getting what they want.

Para 8a. Add new sentence after first sentence:
"Special attention should be given to Latin America/Caribbean Basin."

Reason: Latin America/Caribbean Basin should be broken out of the lump "developing world". The Administration has made an issue of the Soviet-Cuba connection in Central America. It's a threat in our own backyard as opposed to Africa or other third world areas.

Para 8a. Change last sentence as shown.

Reason: Removes possible derrogatory connotation.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

[illegible] and [illegible] issues

[illegible]nt, discuss possible alternative objectives and indicate how MBFR might be downgraded in parallel with initiation of CDE process.

7 - Political Counter-Strategy. Discuss strategy for combating Soviet subversive activities, in Europe and Japan, as well as in developing world. Describe options for public affairs diplomacy (including ICA/VOA), ways to counter-Soviet "peace offensive" in allied-countries and methods for highlighting Soviet interventions in LDCs. This analysis should take account of indigenous LDC forces of nationalism, the weak Soviet foreign assistance record and cooperation in this area with allied and friendly countries.

8. Political Competition in Developing World.

a)- Countering Soviets. Discuss how we can counter the political-military influence of Moscow and Soviet client regimes (including Cuba, Libya, PDRY, Ethiopia, Angola and Syria) and how we can exploit their vulnerabilities. Identify potential Soviet "targets of opportunity" in next two years and how to cope with such dangers. Consider what can be done to undercut Vietnamese control of Kampuchea and support Thailand and ASEAN states. Identify possible [US surrogates / nations] with which we can cooperate in Third Countries. [(e.g. Morocco in Africa)]

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Para 8b. Change first sentence as shown.

Reason: In Latin America we're interested in bilateral assistance from countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela to assist in the South Atlantic or to counter Cuban influence in the Caribbean Basin. There is a play here in conjunction with discussions of Soviet surrogates.

Para 9. Add new sentence at beginning of para.
"Identify the major issues relating to the economic relations between US-USSR. Identify US objectives relating to these issues. Discuss how economic policy fits into overall political and security policy framework.

Reason: Provides framework for development of policy.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

b) - Core Alliance Partners and other Friendly Nations. Discuss how we can generate European [and] Japanese cooperation in containing Soviet expansionism in developing world. Identify particular problems/vulnerabilities of key allies (e.g.-FRG) and how to gain their support. In this connection, analyze the "division of labor" concept and how it might be applied to political, economic and security areas, as well as to greater allied national security commitments to Southwest Asia, taking account of distinctive roles of Europeans and Japan. How can we ensure that allies blame USSR rather than US if East-West relations turn colder?

c) - China. Analyze US interests in the Sino-Soviet-American triangular relationship and how to manage these relationships to our advantage. Discuss how Sino-American cooperation can limit Soviet expansion, including diplomatic and military consultations, [redacted] 25X1 and parallel approaches toward Kampuchea and other international issues. How does arms supply issue fit into this picture? Indicate how Chinese relationships with Japan and Europeans might serve these goals.

9. Economic Issues. Assess in broad terms how we can use economic and security assistance to support US competition with USSR. Summarize the state of US/Soviet trade, joint ventures and technology transfers and the

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

effects of Afghanistan related sanctions. Assess merits of tightening up/easing off on sanctions and what could be achieved in short and medium terms. On the East-West economic front, review Soviet/European gas pipeline, CSCE energy conference, COCOM rules and allied cooperation on common export credit policies toward USSR.

10. Priority Problems. In light of above analysis, how should we deal with current urgent problems.

a) Poland. Summarize present internal political situation in Poland, likely developments through June 1, potential effects on Polish political structure and fall-out effect in other East European states. Consider possible Soviet reactions, identify potential "trigger points" and indicate interaction of Soviet Polish policy with broader US/Soviet relationship. Review possible US reprisals for

SECRET

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Para 10. Add new sub-paras.

"d) Persian Gulf. How should we respond to internal threats against friendly monarchies? What new innovative approaches can we take to create positive movement on the Palestinian issue? What actions are necessary to bring about a multinational approach to Persian Gulf issues?"

Reason: Area was identified in abbreviated TOR but omitted from complete version.

"e) Southeast Asia. Discuss the Soviet expansion into SEA and its role in sponsoring Communist aggression through the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Examine the long range Soviet goal that justifies providing an estimated $5 million a day to the SRV. Determine how the USG can best exploit the vying between the Soviets and Vietnamese for influence in Kampuchea and Laos."

Reason: Policy towards area should be included.

"f) SALT. How best can our national security and foreign policy goals be supported by SALT? Should we commence a strategic dialogue with the USSR prior to establishing our negotiating strategy/tactics on SALT issues? How best can we maintain a strategic dialogue with the Soviets during our reassessment of SALT? What should our position be toward our obligations under SALT II pending resumption of negotiations.

Reason: Highlight importance of SALT.

"g) MBFR. How should we proceed in Alliance to Pact negotiations? Do they serve our national and NATO interests?

Reason: Highlight the urgency of the MBFR negotiations.

Para 11. Delete para.

Reason: Overall objectives and policy need to be developed prior to addressing specific sub-policies and strategies.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Soviet invasion, likely allied reactions and Soviet respons

Analyze Polish economic prospects and broad US/Western options, including possible multilateral (or multiple-bilateral) debt rescheduling.

b) Afghanistan/Southwest Asia. Discuss state of Soviet control in Afghanistan, internal political equation and prospects for negotiated solution. Assess effectiveness of current sanctions, their viability and how they could be made more effective. Review options for supporting Afghan [rebels] freedom fighters, in cooperation with other countries and steps needed to strengthen Pakistan and deter further Soviet intervention in Southwest Asia.

c) CSCE. How should we manage the balance of the Madrid Conference? What are the realistic possibilities to pursue US strategic goals toward the USSR in the post-Madrid CSCE framework? How can we work with the allies to achieve this end?

11. Conclusions. The study should propose specific policy recommendations on the following basic policy issues.

a) Effective linkage between Soviet behavior in Third countries and arms control and other cooperative aspects of US/Soviet relations.

b) Countering activities of Soviet surrogates, and client states, in developing world.

SECRET

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

c) Building US military power which is relevant to current and projected Soviet threat -- in Europe, Northeast Asia, Persian Gulf and developing world.

d) Use of arms control process, and possible agreements to enhance US security.

e) Waging effective political competition with USSR.

f) Exploiting growing economic vulnerabilities of USSR.

g) Enhancing East European autonomy, internal liberalization and access to Western influence.

h) Generating support of allies for these policies.

i) Increasing China's association with the US/ allies in the practical pursuit of these goals.

j) Growing cooperation of friendly LDCs and use of US "surrogates" in support of these US interests.

12. Comment: In addition to seeking specific recommendations on these policy issues, we are developing a number of more detailed questions, such as:

a) What are the feasible elements of the US/ allied military posture which will deter Soviet adventurism in such critical areas as the Persian Gulf region?

b) What are the minimum steps we must take to ensure that the FRG continues to pin down at least 25 percent

SECRET

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2

of Soviet forces on the Chinese border?

c) How can we counter Soviet pressures on our allies and other friendly governments?

d) What specific additional military force characteristics are needed to deter Soviet military moves against US/Allied interests over the next decade? Which of these can be fielded over the next 23-36 months?

e) What "coping measures" can we prepare in the event the Soviets are able to gain control over major resource supplies (i.e., oil)?

f) What should our strategy be for technology transfer issues, both direct and indirect?

g) What measures should the US, its allies and possible surrogates take to cope with the use of proxies by the Soviet Union in the course of "wars of national liberation"?

h) Identify a set of arms control objectives which the West can pursue in the present military environment. Will we be in a better position to achieve these objectives, on the strength of an improved military balance, five years from now then today?

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/02 : CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090031-2